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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians (the “Tribe” or 
the “Band”) owns much of the land under Palm Springs, Cathedral 
City and Rancho Mirage, California.1  It operates resorts, casinos, 
       †      Gary Goldsmith received his J.D. from the University of Minnesota Law 
School in 1979.  He has served as Assistant Director and Management Analyst for 
the Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board and was recently 
appointed as the Board’s Executive Director.  The author thanks Jeanne Olson 
and Jeffrey Sigurdson for their valuable input and guidance in the preparation of 
this article. 
 1. Agua Caliente History & Culture, http://www.aguacaliente.org/ 
default.aspx?tabid=57#overview (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
1
Goldsmith: Big Spenders in State Elections—Has Financial Participation by In
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
GOLDSMITH - ADC 2/3/2008  2:55:06 PM 
660 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
and housing complexes.2  It also participates financially in a 
significant way in California’s electoral process.3
That participation led to a confrontation over transactions 
dating back to 1998 between the Tribe and the California Fair 
Political Practices Commission (FPPC)4, the agency charged with 
enforcing California’s Political Reform Act (PRA), which regulates 
financial activities related to California’s elections and lobbying.5
On June 20, 2007, after nearly five years of litigation, in which 
the Tribe was unable to successfully assert its claimed right of 
sovereign immunity from suit, the parties entered into a stipulation 
in which the Agua Caliente Band “expressly waive[d] its sovereign 
immunity with respect to any enforcement of the Political Reform 
Act . . . by the Fair Political Practices Commission for any future 
violation of the Political Reform Act . . . .”6
The trend of tribal financial involvement in state politics is also 
well illustrated in Minnesota.  In 2006, when all state legislative and 
constitutional offices7 were on the ballot, political committees 
registered by Minnesota Indian Tribes with the Minnesota 
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board8 spent more than 
$1.2 million to influence the election of candidates for state 
offices.9  More than $900,000 of that total was spent by the political 
committees of just two tribes with more than $700,000 of that going 
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally Agua Caliente FPPC Compliance Information, 
http://www.aguacaliente.org/GovernmentAffairsPress/FPPCCompliance 
Information/tabid/104/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
 4. FPPC v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No. 02AS04545, 2003 
WL 733094  (Sacramento County Super. Ct. of Cal., Feb. 27, 2003).  The Second 
Amended Complaint alleges unreported contributions and other violations 
beginning in 1998.  Second Amended Complaint, available at http://www.fppc.ca. 
gov/pdf/acl/AguaCalSAC2.pdf 
 5. Political Reform Act of 1974, 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 365, sec. 4 (West) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81000 (2005)). 
 6. Stipulation for J., FPPC v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, No. 
02AS04545 (Sacramento County Super. Ct. of Cal. 2002). 
 7. Minnesota’s legislative offices consist of sixty-seven state senators and 134 
state representatives.  MINN. STAT. § 2.031 subdiv. 1 (2006).  Constitutional officers 
include the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor and 
State Attorney General.  MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1. 
 8. The Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board is the 
state agency charged with regulating and obtaining disclosure of financial matters 
related to state elections and lobbying.  MINN. STAT. § 10A.02 subdiv. 8 (2006). 
 9. Summary of 2006 Reports of Receipts and Expenditures (on file with the 
Minnesota Campaign Finance Board) [hereinafter Reports], available at 
http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/rptViewer/viewRptsOther.php. 
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to the several organizational units of the Minnesota Democratic 
Farmer Labor Party.10
Minnesota tribal political spending in 2002, the previous year 
in which all state offices were on the ballot, totaled less than half 
the 2006 amount, at just over $598,000.11
While all Minnesota Tribes as a group spent $1.2 million for 
political purposes in 2006, the Agua Caliente Band by itself made 
more than $2 million in expenditures and contributions to 
influence California’s elections.12  Although significant compared 
to Minnesota tribal spending, that sum was much lower than the 
Agua Caliente Band’s spending in 2004, its highest year.13  That 
year Proposition 70, an initiative measure related to Indian gaming 
operations that would amend both the California Code and the 
California Constitution, was on the general election ballot.14  The 
Agua Caliente Band spent more than $16 million to influence state 
elections in 2004, including more than $13 million specifically 
related to Proposition 70.15
There seems to be little question that Indian tribes are 
becoming a powerful force in the states’ political processes, and 
that many tribes have the funds to support their efforts.  In 
Minnesota, most of those funds come from tribal gaming or related 
operations.16
 10. Reports, supra note 9. While candidate committees have limits on the 
contributions they may accept, political party units do not.  Id.  The Minnesota 
Democratic Farmer Labor Party is the state party affiliate of the Democratic Party.  
Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Major Donors and Independent Expenditure Committee Campaign 
Statement for the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians [hereinafter Agua 
Caliente], available at  http://www.aguacaliente.org/GovernmentAffairsPress/FP 
PCComplianceInformation/tabid/104/Default.aspx (follow “Report for dates 07-
01-06–12-31-06” hyperlink). 
 13. Aqua Caliente, supra note 12, at Report for dates 01-01-04–12-31-04. 
 14. Official California Voter Information Guide, http://vote2004.sos.ca.gov/ 
voterguide/propositions/prop70-arguments.htm. 
 15. Aqua Caliente, supra note 12, at Report for dates 07-01-04–12-31-04 . 
 16. Tribal political committees file disclosure statements with the Minnesota 
Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board under Minnesota Statutes section 
10A.27 subdivision 13, which requires an entity not registered with the Board (the 
Tribe) to disclose the source of funds transferred to a registered entity (the Tribal 
political committee).  Only two—the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe and the White 
Earth Reservation—specifically list gaming revenue on their 2006 §10A.27 
Disclosure Statements.  The Leech Lake Band disclosed $4000 in funds from the 
Leech Lake Gaming Division.  Report of Receipts and Expenditures, available at 
http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/40889.pdf.  
The White Earth Reservation disclosed a contribution of $500 from its general 
3
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Tribal gaming got its start in 1987 after the U.S. Supreme 
Court held in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians17 that 
states’ regulatory laws concerning gambling could not be applied to 
tribal gaming operations on reservation land.18  That decision was 
followed closely by adoption of the federal Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act19 (IGRA) in 1988.  The IGRA was intended “to 
provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian 
tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments . . . .”20  Following 
enactment of the IGRA, high stakes, casino-style Indian gaming 
began to emerge as the major source of income for many tribes.21
In every election cycle, Indian tribes vigorously attempt to 
influence such critical matters of state governance as to who will be 
the state’s governor,22 who will be elected to the state’s legislative 
fund revenue.  Report of Receipts and Expenditures, available at 
http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/40916.pdf.   
  Other tribes list income from afilliated businesses.  For example, the 
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux community lists income from its recreational 
vehicle park, disclosing $675,000 in transfers from “non-gaming revenues from the 
Shakopee Dakota Meadows RV Park.  Report of Receipts and Expenditures, 
available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006/CampFin/YE/405 
50.pdf.  The park is an integral part of the Tribe’s casino and golf course complex.  
See Welcome to Dakotah Meadows!, http://www.ccsmdc.org/DakMead/ (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2007).   
  The 750 member Prairie Island Indian Community transferred $175,000 
in “Tribal Tax Revenues” to its political committee in 2006.  Report of Receipts 
and Expenditures, available at http://www.cfbreport.state.mn.us/pdfStorage/2006 
/CampFin/YE/30555.pdf.  The Prairie Island Community operates Treasure 
Island Resort & Casino which includes a casino, luxury hotel, four restaurants, and 
other attractions.  See Prairie Island Indian Community, http://www.prairieisland. 
org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2007); see also http://www.treasureislandcasino.com (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2007).   
 17. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 18. See id. at 221–22 (holding that where states regulated rather than 
prohibited gaming activities, the state regulations could not be applied on 
reservations). 
 19. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–03, 2706–14, 2716–17(a), 2719–21 (2006). 
 20. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2006). 
 21. See ALAN MEISTER, CASINO CITY’S INDIAN GAMING INDUSTRY REPORT, 2007–
2008 (6th ed. 2007).  The report estimates that revenue (amounts wagered less 
prizes and payouts) at Indian gaming establishments rose from approximately 
$121 million in 1988 to more than $25 billion in 2006. 
 22. In Minnesota in 2006, five tribes donated a total of $8500 to the 
Democratic candidate for governor (the maximum donation allowed was $2,000 
per donor).  See Reports, supra, note 9. (Reports of Receipts and Expenditures for 
the year ending December 31, 2006.)  (Select first letter of donor name then click 
on link to the specific donor.)  The following tribal political committees 
contributed to Mike Hatch, the Democratic candidate for governor, in 2006: Bois 
4
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bodies,23 and what will be the provisions of the state’s constitution.24  
These incursions into the realm of state governance have renewed 
questions about the sovereignty of Indian tribes in relation to the 
states’ sovereignty. 
In order to understand those conflicting rights, this article will 
review the historical roots of legal doctrine regarding the position 
of Indian tribes with respect to the United States government and 
each state’s government.25  It will then trace significant doctrinal 
changes that arose as the result of changing political and cultural 
attitudes toward Indians.26  Finally, it will address new theories 
raised in Agua Caliente v. California FPPC27 and will comment on the 
California Supreme Court’s resolution of the constitutional issues 
and the parties’ eventual Stipulation for Judgment in that matter.28
II. JOHN MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT ESTABLISH THE 
ROOTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The first United States Supreme Court case to address the 
status of Indian tribes was Johnson v. M’Intosh.29  When  M’Intosh was 
before the Court, John Marshall was in his twenty-second year as 
Chief Justice of the Court.30  He had successfully laid several 
important foundations for a strong federal government31 and had 
Forts Political Education Fund ($1000), Fond du Lac Committee of Political 
Education ($2000), Leech Lake PAC ($500), Mah Mah Wi No Min Fund I—the 
political fund of the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe Indians, ($2000), Prairie Island 
Indian Community PAC ($2000), Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux ($2000). 
 23. See generally Reports, supra note 9 (Reports of Receipts and Expenditures 
filed by Minnesota tribal political committees for the year ending December 31, 
2006, showing numerous contributions to Minnesota candidates). 
 24. See discussion of California’s Proposition 70 supra note 12; supra note 9. 
 25. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 26. See infra Parts V–VI. 
 27. 148 P.3d 1126 (2007). 
 28. See infra Parts VII–VIII. 
 29. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 30. John Marshall was appointed to the Supreme Court by John Adams in 
1801, and served until 1835.  JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL—DEFINER OF A 
NATION 282, 523 (1996). 
 31. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Court 
established the doctrine of inherent powers granted in the Constitution to the 
federal government and the supremacy of federal institutions over state laws that 
might hinder their purpose.  In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), 
Marshall laid out his expansive view of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
and Congress’ power to regulate the broad range of activities that would thereafter 
be considered part of commerce between the states. 
5
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established the Judiciary as a powerful branch of that government.32  
Given Marshall’s federalist credentials,33 it is not surprising that in 
this first of the Indian cases, the decision between rights of the 
Indians and rights of the United States government in certain land 
resulted in a doctrine that strengthened the federal government at 
the expense of the Indians. 
M’Intosh involved an action for ejectment in which the 
defendant claimed the disputed land through a patent from the 
United States and the plaintiffs claimed the same land through 
conveyances from the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians.34  Judgment 
in the court below found that only the United States had the right 
to transfer title to the land.35
The question, according to Marshall, was confined to “the 
power of the Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a 
title which can be sustained by the courts of this country,”36 but to 
answer that question, Marshall would have to examine the 
relationship between the United States and the Indians.  Marshall 
concluded that the Indians did not have the power to give title to 
the land they occupied.37
To reach this conclusion, Marshall began with a fundamental 
premise that “cannot be drawn into question.”38  His premise was 
that it is the right of a society to prescribe rules by which title to 
lands may be acquired.  Thus, those rules must depend entirely on 
the law of the nation in which the lands lie.39
A key principle of the law of “civilized” nations was that 
“discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by 
whose authority, it was made. . . .”40  From this principle of the 
discoverer’s right, two corollaries arose. First, the discoverer had 
the sole right of acquiring the soil from any Indians who may be in 
 32. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 37 (1803), Marshall wrote the opinion 
establishing the doctrine of judicial review, giving the Court the authority to 
review the constitutionality of legislative acts.  Marbury was followed by cases 
establishing the federal courts’ authority to review civil cases, i.e., Martin v. 
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816), and criminal cases, Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
264 (1821). 
 33. SMITH, supra note 30, at 8. 
 34. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 572. 
 37. Id. at 603–605. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 573. 
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possession; and second, relations between the discoverer and 
Indians were to be regulated by those parties.41
Marshall recognized that in establishing the relationship 
between Indians and the discoverer, the rights of the Indians “were 
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.”42  The Indians were 
recognized as having a right of possession or occupancy of the soil, 
but “their power to dispose of the soil at their own will . . . was 
denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it.”43  As a result, the Indians’ 
“rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were 
necessarily diminished . . . .”44
The Indians’ right to possession might be extinguished “by 
purchase or by conquest”45 and “[c]onquest gives a title which the 
Courts of the conqueror cannot deny . . . .”46  The claims of Britain 
had been established and maintained as far west as the Mississippi 
“by the sword” and it was not for the courts, Marshall said, to 
question the validity of this title.47
Having decided that the absolute title to the land, resides in 
the conqueror and that absolute title to land cannot reside in two 
entities at the same time,48 Marshall concluded that only the United 
States could transfer valid title to the subject land.49  The Indian 
inhabitants, he said, “are to be considered merely as occupants, to 
be protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their 
lands, but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title 
to others.”50
M’Intosh established two principles that would shape United 
States Indian law.  First, while Indians may have considered 
themselves to be sovereigns or nations, that sovereignty was 
diminished by discovery and conquest.  Second, the Indians were 
merely occupants of the land with no actual ownership rights.  
Even their occupancy of the land was subject to the authority of the 
United States. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 574. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 587. 
 46. Id. at 588. 
 47. Id. at 588–89. 
 48. Id. at 588. 
 49. Id. at 587–88. 
 50. Id. at 591. 
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Marshall next addressed the status of Indian tribes in 1831.  
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia51 arose as the result of a motion by the 
Cherokee Nation of Indians for an injunction to restrain the State 
of Georgia from enforcing its laws on lands within the Cherokee 
territory.  Georgia was essentially attempting to abolish the 
Cherokee Nation.  It nullified Cherokee laws, extended Georgia 
law to the Cherokee territory, and provided for the survey of all 
Cherokee lands in Georgia and for their distribution by lottery to 
the people of Georgia.52
Georgia was losing patience with the federal government, 
which had agreed as a condition of Georgia’s cession of territorial 
land to the United States in 1802 to extinguish Indian claims to the 
land that remained as part of the State of Georgia.53  The Indian 
Removal Act of 183054 had just passed giving President Andrew 
Jackson the authority to negotiate treaties wherein Indian tribes 
would exchange land east of the Mississippi for land in the west and 
would relocate to that land.  The Cherokees were unwilling to trade 
their land and relocate.55  Georgia decided to take matters into its 
own hands. 
Marshall candidly stated what had happened to the Cherokee 
nation since discovery: 
A people once numerous, powerful, and truly 
independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and 
uncontrolled possession of an ample domain, gradually 
sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our 
arms, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each 
of which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue, until 
they retain no more of their formerly extensive territory 
than is deemed necessary to their comfortable 
subsistence.56
 51. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 52. See id. at 7, 13. 
 53. See id. at 8.  The Cherokee Indians ceded land in Georgia making their 
reservation smaller and smaller until it was so small that they “resolved to cede no 
more.”  Id.  Georgia applied to the United States to remove the Indians by force in 
order to meet its obligations under the cession agreement of 1802.  Id.  Presidents 
Monroe and Adams agreed to remove the Indians, but only by peaceful means.  Id.  
The state of Georgia then resorted to its own means to force the Cherokee Indians 
from lands within the state.  Id. 
 54. 21st Cong., Sess. I, ch. 148, 411–12 (1830), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&rec
Num=458. 
 55. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 10. 
 56. Id. at 15. 
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After expressing sympathy for the claim, Marshall began a 
detailed examination of the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.  
Article Three of the Constitution provides that the federal courts 
shall have jurisdiction over cases “between a state or the citizens 
thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.”57  The question of 
jurisdiction hinged on whether the Cherokee nation was a “foreign 
state.”58
Justice Marshall recognized that the Cherokee tribe had many 
of the attributes of a state in the sense that it was “a distinct political 
society . . . capable of managing its own affairs . . . .”59  But, he also 
recognized the unique situation that this state-within-a-state 
relationship created.60  Indian territory, for example, was part of the 
United States61 and in the areas of commerce and foreign relations, 
the tribes were considered as within the jurisdiction of the United 
States.62  It is in this context that Marshall questioned whether 
Indian tribes may accurately be described as foreign nations.63  He 
reasoned that “[t]hey may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations.”64
In his concurring opinion, Justice Johnson said the tribes 
“never have been recognized as holding sovereignty over the 
territory they occupy.”65  But he also recognized that “their right of 
personal self government has never been taken from them . . . .”66
Not surprisingly, Marshall concluded that Indian tribes are not 
foreign states within the meaning of the Constitution.67  Therefore, 
the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.68  
Cherokee Nation is important not so much for the jurisdictional 
holding but for the analysis of the Indians’ status and its conclusion 
that Indian tribes were not completely sovereign but were 
“domestic dependent nations.”69
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 16. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 13–14. 
 61. Id. at 17. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 22. 
 66. Id. at 27. 
 67. Id. at 20. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 17. 
9
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Justice Marshall had another opportunity to examine the 
status of the Cherokee’s relationship with the state of Georgia and 
with the United States the following year.  In Worchester v. Georgia,70 
one of the same Georgia statutes that gave rise to Cherokee Nation 
was again the subject of review.  This time jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court was proper as the case was between a citizen of 
Vermont and the state of Georgia.71
Under Georgia’s new laws, Worcester had been convicted of 
residing in Cherokee territory without permission from the state 
and without swearing an oath to support and defend the 
constitution and laws of Georgia.72  He was sentenced to four years 
of hard labor in the state penitentiary.73  Worcester’s contention 
was that Georgia’s act was unconstitutional and void because it was 
repugnant to treaties between the United States and the Cherokee 
and because it interfered with intercourse between the Cherokee 
nation and the United States, an area of the law reserved to 
Congress.74
Justice Marshall reviewed the relationship between the 
Cherokees and the United States government from discovery 
through the 1791 Treaty of Holston,75 which he found had been 
frequently renewed and was still in full force.76  This treaty, Marshall 
concluded, “explicitly recogniz[ed] the national character of the 
Cherokees, and their right of self government; thus guarantying 
their lands; assuming the duty of protection, and of course 
pledging the faith of the United States for that protection . . . .”77
Marshall concluded that: 
The Indian nations had always been considered as 
distinct, independent political communities, retaining 
their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors 
of the soil, from time immemorial, with the single 
exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which 
secluded them from intercourse with any other European 
 70. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 71. Id. at 536. 
 72. Id. at 537. 
 73. Id. at 540. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 554–56. 
 76. Id. at 556. 
 77. Id. 
10
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potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the 
particular region claimed . . . .78
Further evidence of the Indians’ status was found in the fact 
that the United States generally applied the term “nation” to 
Indian tribes and regularly entered into treaties with the tribes.79  
The Constitution, declaring such treaties to be the supreme law of 
the land, acknowledged the status of Indian tribes as “among those 
powers who are capable of making treaties.”80
The fact that the Cherokees, by treaty, placed themselves in 
the protection of the United States did not limit their right to self-
government.  Rather, the very fact of the repeated signing of 
treaties with the Cherokees recognized that right.  According to 
Justice Marshall, it was the settled law of nations that a weaker 
nation accepting the protection of a stronger one does not, 
therein, surrender its right to self-government.81
The Court’s conclusion became inescapable: the whole 
intercourse between the United States and the Cherokee nation, 
being vested by the Constitution and laws in the government of the 
United States, mandates that the laws of Georgia can have no effect 
within the boundaries of the Cherokee territory.82
Thus, by 1835, it was clear that Indian tribes were considerably 
less than sovereign nations.  They had no absolute title to their 
land and were under the “protection” of the United States.  But 
they still had the right to deal with the United States by way of 
treaties and their sovereignty against the authority of the individual 
states appeared to be established. 
III. THE PROMISES OF INDIAN TREATIES ARE WEAKENED AS A BASIS 
FOR TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY. 
The limits of tribal sovereignty were tested soon and regularly.  
One of the first areas to be limited was Indian treaty rights.  In 
1845, in United States v. Rogers,83 the defendant, a white man, was 
accused of murdering another white man in Cherokee territory.84  
The defendant claimed that the Cherokee had adopted both him 
 78. Id. at 559. 
 79. Id. at 559–60. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 561. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). 
 84. Id. 567–68. 
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and the deceased into their tribe.85  The U.S. law in question 
extended federal criminal jurisdiction over all lands within the sole 
and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except for 
jurisdiction over crimes by one Indian against another.86  A treaty 
with the Cherokee Indians gave them the right to govern their 
territory so long as their laws were not inconsistent with those of 
the United States.87
The Court began by holding that Cherokee territory was land 
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States and 
that the Cherokee Indians occupied it only with the consent of the 
United States.88  That Rogers was a member of the Cherokee tribe 
was no objection to the jurisdiction of the district court.89  As 
support for this position, the Court said: 
[W]e think it too firmly and clearly established to admit of 
dispute that the Indian tribes residing within the 
territorial limits of the United States are subject to their 
authority, and where the country occupied by them is not 
within the limits of one of the States, Congress may by law 
punish any offense committed there, no matter whether 
the offender be a white man or an Indian.90
But the federal statute excluded crimes by one Indian against 
another.  After making the statement quoted above, that the 
nationality of the offender would not matter, the Court 
nevertheless held that the adoption of the defendant into the tribe 
did not make him an Indian within the meaning of the federal 
statute.91  Holding that the defendant was not an Indian appears to 
render the statement quoted above as dicta.  That same statement 
would be cited and quoted as holding twenty-five years later in The 
Cherokee Tobacco.92
By 1870, federal statutes were coming into direct conflict with 
Indian treaties in ways that could not be reconciled.  In The Cherokee 
Tobacco, the Court considered the conflict between a federal statute 
imposing a tax on tobacco in all territories within the boundaries of 
     85.  Id. at 568  
 86. Id. at 570–71. 
 87. Id. at 573. 
 88. See id. at 572. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 573.  The Rogers Court also considered whether the treaty with 
the Cherokee tribe precluded application of the federal statute and found the 
statute and the treaty not to be in conflict.  Id.
 92. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 619 (1870). 
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the United States and an Indian treaty provision that allowed 
Indians to grow and sell tobacco, paying tax only on that portion 
sold outside Indian territory.93  The defendant owners of the 
subject tobacco, the impoundment of which was sought by the 
United States, were Cherokee Indians who had grown the tobacco 
within the boundaries of the Cherokee nation. 
The Court cited Cherokee Nation for the proposition that Indian 
Territory is part of the United States.94  It then repeated the entire 
quote from Rogers for the proposition that Indians residing in the 
territorial United States are under the jurisdiction of the United 
States, saying that both principles were “so well settled in our 
jurisprudence that it would be a waste of time to discuss them or to 
refer to further authorities in their support.”95
Relying on cases involving treaties with foreign nations,96 The 
Cherokee Tobacco Court held that an act of Congress could supersede 
a prior treaty.97  When the two cannot be reconciled, legislative 
action is to be given effect in the courts and any resolution of the 
conflict must be addressed in the legislative branch.98  Thus, by 
1870, the power of Congress to abrogate the provisions of Indian 
treaties was established. 
The next year the power of Indians to enter into new treaties 
with the United States was abolished by statute.  The act of March 
3, 1871, provided that: 
No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the 
United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
independent nation, tribe, or power, with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of 
any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian 
nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby 
invalidated or impaired.99
Fifteen years later, in United States v. Kagama,100 Justice Miller 
lamented that, “after an experience of a hundred years of the 
treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined 
 93. Id. at 617. 
 94. See id. at 619. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 621.  The court cited Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784 (2 Curtis 
454) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13799); The Clinton Bridge, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 454 
(1870).   
 97. Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 617. 
 98. Id. at 621. 
 99. 16 Stat. 566; Rev. Stat. §2079 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §71 (2006)). 
 100. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
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upon a new departure, -to govern [the Indians] by acts of 
Congress.”101
Kagama examined a congressional act that extended U.S. 
criminal law to crimes by one Indian against another, regardless of 
whether the crime was committed on Indian land.102  On the 
question of the act’s constitutionality, the Court found little in the 
language of the Constitution to help.  It determined that the power 
of Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes did not 
provide a basis for the legislation.103  Relying on Cherokee Nation for 
the premise that Indian tribes are not states or nations, the Court 
upheld the act, holding that there are only two sovereignties in the 
United States; that of the federal government and that of the 
states.104
In what now may seem a sad commentary, Justice Miller raised 
the government “protection” relationship with the Indians as part 
of the basis for stripping them of another aspect of their 
sovereignty.  He said: 
The power of the general government over these 
remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and 
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as 
well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell.  It 
must exist in that government, because it never has 
existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise 
is within the geographical limits of the United States; 
because it has never been denied; and because it alone 
can enforce its laws on all the tribes.105
After Kagama, it was clearly established that Indian tribes had 
no treaties and no inherent sovereignty that would protect them 
against congressional action.  They were now truly dependent on 
the will of Congress to protect the remaining remnants of their 
existence as governments.  The authority of the states over Indian 
tribes, however, was a different matter.  The holding of Worcester 
remained strong, although states were beginning to succeed in 
asserting their jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands. 
 101. Id. at 382. 
 102. See id. at 376–77. 
 103. See id. at 378–79. 
 104. See id. at 379. 
 105. Id. at 384–85. 
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IV. STATES’ EFFORTS TO EXERT THEIR JURISDICTION OVER TRIBAL 
LANDS AND MEMBERS 
The first successful state encroachments on tribal sovereignty 
involved assertion of state court jurisdiction over non-Indians in 
events that occurred on Indian reservations. 
In 1881, the Court considered United States v. McBratney,106 a 
case in which a white man, McBratney, was convicted in federal 
circuit court of the murder of another white man.  The murder 
occurred on the Ute Indian Reservation in Colorado.107
Federal jurisdiction was supported by a statute giving the 
courts of the United States jurisdiction over the crime of murder 
occurring in parts of the country under the “exclusive jurisdiction 
of the United States,” including Indian country.108  Additional 
support for federal jurisdiction was found in the treaty of March 2, 
1868, between the United States and the Ute Indians, which 
provided for trial and punishment under U.S. law of wrongs by 
whites against Indians or others on the Ute Indians’ territory.109
Subsequent to enactment of the federal criminal statute and 
signing of the treaty, the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, chapter 
139, provided for the admission of Colorado to the Union.  The act 
authorized the inhabitants of the territory to form a state 
government; it did not contain any exception for the Ute 
reservation, or jurisdiction over it, from the new state.110
McBratney challenged the jurisdiction of the U.S. court over 
the matter, claiming that jurisdiction lay in the state courts of 
Colorado.111  Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the Court.112
Relying on Cherokee Tobacco, the Court held that the act 
forming the state of Colorado necessarily repealed any prior 
federal statute or treaty provision that was inconsistent with the 
act.113  Further, the Court held that the act, which established 
Colorado “upon an equal footing with the original States in all 
respects whatever,”114 gave the state criminal jurisdiction over all of 
 106. 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
 107. Id. at 621–22. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 622. 
 110. See id. at 623. 
 111. Id. at 621–22. 
 112. Id. at 621. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 624. 
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its own citizens throughout its territorial limits, including the Ute 
Reservation.115  The earlier federal statute and treaty provisions 
giving exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes to the United 
States government were repealed by implication because they were 
inconsistent with the statehood act.116
McBratney established the principle that state jurisdiction is not 
always limited by the reservation boundary.117  It was no longer an 
absolute rule that the United States or the Indian tribes had sole 
and exclusive jurisdiction over activities on reservations.118
The McBratney finding—that the new state of Colorado had 
jurisdiction over non-Indian crimes against other non-Indians—was 
extended to the original states in New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin.119  
The Ray Court said that McBratney and cases that followed it “all 
held that in the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or 
congressional enactment, each state had a right to exercise 
jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries.”120
The reach of state criminal jurisdiction on reservations was 
clarified in Donnelly v. United States,121 wherein the defendant, a 
white man who had murdered an Indian, challenged federal 
jurisdiction.122  There, it was held that the McBratney doctrine was 
limited to crimes of non-Indians against non-Indians and federal 
jurisdiction could be maintained where one of the parties involved 
in the incident was an Indian.123
The limit of state court jurisdiction was further clarified in 
Williams v. Lee124 in which Williams, a non-Indian, operated a store 
on the Navajo reservation.  He sued in Arizona state court to collect 
money owed to him by two Navajo Indians for credit extended at 
his store.125
The Court held that suit in state court to collect a debt 
incurred by Indians on their reservation was prohibited because 
imposition of state jurisdiction in such a situation would infringe 
 115. Id.
   116.    Id.   
 117. See id. at 621–24. 
   118.    Id. at 624. 
 119. 326 U.S. 496 (1946). 
 120. Id. at 499. 
 121. 228 U.S. 243 (1913). 
   122.    Id. at 252. 
 123. See id. at 271–72. 
 124. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
 125. Id. at 217–18. 
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on the tribe’s sovereignty.126  Justice Black, delivering the opinion of 
the Court, said that although the Court had modified the 
principles of Worcester over the years “in cases where essential tribal 
relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would 
not be jeopardized,”127 its basic policy was still law.  The Court went 
on to say that “[e]ssentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the 
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the 
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
them.”128  Justice Black’s announcement of what appeared to be an 
infringement test for determining the scope of state jurisdiction 
over Indian tribes was a significant departure from the absolute 
doctrine expressed in Worcester and from prior decisions.129
Applying the newly announced test to the facts before it in 
Williams, the Court held that there could be no doubt that “to allow 
the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the 
authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence 
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”130  
If the power of self-government was to be taken away from the 
Indians, the Court said, it was for Congress to take that action.131
The result reached in Williams is far less important than the 
principle the Court established: that state jurisdiction over tribes 
may be allowed if it does not infringe on the tribe’s right to self-
government.132  After Williams, the strength of tribal sovereignty 
principles to protect tribes from incursions of state law was 
weakened, but still appeared strong, at least where the state action 
would unduly infringe on the tribe’s right of self-government.133  
But the clarity of the doctrine expressed in Worcester in 1835 was an 
idea of the past.134
 126. Id. at 223. 
 127. Id. at 219. 
 128. Id. at 220. 
 129. Id. at 223; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
 130. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223. 
 131. The Court also noted that although Congress granted to the states the 
right to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over Reservations and their resident 
Indians, Arizona had not taken the steps to assume such jurisdiction.  Id. at 224 
n.10.  Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 substituted provisions giving the 
consent of the United States to states’ assumption of jurisdiction over tribal civil 
and criminal matters, but required approval of the tribe by vote of a majority of its 
members.  25 U.S.C. § 1322 (a) (1968). 
 132. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. 
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Another important case to address tribal sovereignty was 
McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona,135 in which the State 
of Arizona attempted to impose its personal income tax on a 
Navajo Indian who lived on the reservation and derived all of her 
income from reservation sources.136  The Arizona state courts that 
considered the matter held that the application was permissible.137  
On review by the United States Supreme Court, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall wrote on behalf of the Court.138  Justice Marshall 
recognized that the Indian sovereignty doctrine had not remained 
static in the 141 years since the decision in Worcester.139  Rather, it 
had undergone “considerable evolution in response to changed 
circumstances.”140  In McClanahan, Marshall observed that “the 
trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty 
as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-
emption.”141  According to Marshall, “[t]he modern cases thus tend 
to avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to 
look instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define the 
limits of state power.”142
The Indian sovereignty doctrine no longer provided the basis 
for “definitive resolution” of state jurisdiction matters, but provided 
a “backdrop” against which treaties and federal statutes should be 
read.143  Against that backdrop, the Court found that treaties with 
the Navajo Indians and federal statutes prohibited Arizona’s 
attempt to impose its income tax on Indians living and working on 
the reservation.144
McClanahan is significant in part for its general acceptance, 
with clarification, of the Williams infringement test.  Williams 
provided that “absent any governing Acts of Congress” the test to 
be applied is whether a state action infringes on the right of Indian 
self-government.145
 135. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). 
   136.    Id. at 165.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
   139.    Id. at 171. 
 140. Id. at 171. 
 141. Id. at 172. 
 142. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 181. 
 145. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
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The McClanahan Court considered the relevance of the 
Williams test to the case sub judice and noted that the “cases 
applying the Williams test dealt principally with situations involving 
non-Indians.”146  In such cases, “both the tribe and the State could 
fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions.  
The Williams infringement test was designed to resolve this conflict 
by providing that the State could protect its interest up to the point 
where tribal self-government would be affected.”147  In McClanahan, 
the income that Arizona wanted to tax was earned by an Indian 
solely through reservation sources.148  Thus, the matter was entirely 
within the scope of jurisdiction retained by the tribe by treaty and 
federal statute.149  In such a case, the treaties and federal statutes 
preempt state law and the Williams infringement test is not 
applicable.150
V. THE REGULATORY CASES PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATES 
TO INCREASE THEIR POWER OVER INDIAN TRIBES 
Based on Williams as clarified by McClanahan, the law as of 
1973 seemed to be that if federal statutes and treaties governed a 
matter, then state jurisdiction on reservation land would not 
apply.151  If the matter was not preempted by federal law and 
treaties, then whether the state could assert jurisdiction depended 
on whether the state’s action infringed to an unacceptable degree 
on the tribal right of self-government.  So, because of the state 
interest in governing its own territory, state jurisdiction over 
activities that occurred off of reservations would be easier to 
establish. 
In Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,152 the Indian tribe did not 
have a reservation or a treaty with the United States.  The dispute 
was whether state law that prohibited salmon traps could be 
enforced against the tribe on state land.153  The tribe had been 
granted permits for the traps by the United States government.154  
The Court held that state law was applicable to prohibit use of the 
 146. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 179. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 165. 
 149. Id. at 179–80. 
 150. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 217. 
 151. See id.; see also McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 164. 
 152. 369 U.S. 60 (1962). 
   153.    Id. at 62.  
   154.    Id. at 61. 
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traps.155 citing Williams and New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin the Court 
said that: 
These decisions indicate that even on reservations state 
laws may be applied to Indians unless such application 
would interfere with reservation self-government or 
impair a right granted or reserved by federal law . . . . 
State authority over Indians is yet more extensive over 
activities, such as in this case, not on any reservation.156
Although Organized Village of Kake predated McClanahan, it 
continued to be cited for the proposition that state authority over 
off-reservation activities was more easily established than it would 
be for conduct within Indian territory.157
Thus, in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,158 the Court held that 
the state could impose its gross receipts tax on a ski resort operated 
by a tribe on land outside the reservation.159  The Court recognized 
the line of cases prohibiting state taxation of on-reservation 
activities, but relied on Organized Village of Kake for its ruling, saying 
that “Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally 
been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise 
applicable to all citizens of the state.”160
In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead 
Reservation,161 the Court considered the state of Montana’s attempt 
to apply its cigarette tax to all sales of cigarettes by Indian 
smokeshops operated on reservation lands.162  Relying on 
McClanahan, the Court prohibited the application of the cigarette 
tax to on-reservation sales to Indians.163  But the Court was 
unwilling to extend McClanahan to prohibit imposition of state tax 
   155.    Id. at 68. 
 156. Id. at 75. 
   157.    See Texas v. U.S., 497 F.3d 491, 510 (5th Cir. 2007); People of South 
Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 876–77 (D. Alaska 1979); John v. 
Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 773 (Alaska 1999); State ex rel. Peterson v. Dist. Court of 
Ninth Judicial Dist., 617 P.2d 1056, 1063 (Wyo. 1980).   
 158. 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
   159.    Id. at 157–58. 
 160. Id. at 148–49 (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 
392 (1968) (upholding the state’s right to regulate the time and manner of 
Indian’s off-reservation fishing rights); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) 
(upholding state jurisdiction over off-reservation hunting; and other cases)). 
   161.    425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
 162. Id. at 467–68. 
 163. Id. at 480–81. 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/7
GOLDSMITH - ADC 2/3/2008  2:55:06 PM 
2008] TRIBAL PARTICIPATION IN STATE ELECTIONS 679 
 
on cigarette sales to non-Indians.164  The tax in question was a direct 
tax imposed by statute on the purchaser and collected by the seller 
merely as a convenience.165  As such, it was not a tax on the tribe, 
which would have been prohibited by McClanahan.166
The tribes argued that making them an involuntary tax 
collector was a gross interference with their right to be free of state 
regulation.167  The Court disagreed, holding that “[t]he State’s 
requirement that the Indian tribal seller collect a tax validly 
imposed on non-Indians [was] a minimal burden designed to avoid 
the likelihood that in its absence non-Indians purchasing from the 
tribal seller will avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax.”168  While 
the activities that would be required in the tax collection system 
were not described, the Court held that because the collection 
burden was not a tax on the Indians, the cases prohibiting taxation 
of tribes themselves were inapplicable.169  The Court saw “nothing 
in this burden which frustrates tribal self-government or runs afoul 
of any congressional enactment dealing with the affairs of 
reservation Indians.”170  Because the state tax was not preempted by 
federal law and the burden on the tribes was acceptable, 
application of the Williams infringement test did not require 
striking down the state statutes.171
The state of Washington took the matter of state tax collection 
further.  In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation,172 the state imposed both a cigarette tax and a state sales 
tax which applied to cigarettes and other items sold by Indian 
businesses on the reservation to non-Indian purchasers.173  The 
Court recognized that the large majority of cigarette sales from 
these shops were to non-Indians traveling to the reservation to take 
advantage of the tribes’ claimed exemption from the state tax.174  
The Indians’ businesses were therefore largely dependent on their 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 482. 
 166. Id. at 480–81. 
   167.    Id. at 482.  
 168. Id. at 483. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.; see also United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938). 
 171. Moe, 425 U.S. at 483. 
   172.    447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
 173. Id. 141–42. 
 174. Id. at 145. 
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tax-exempt status which, if lost, would cause sales of cigarettes to 
fall sharply.175
Based on Moe, the Court held that the state could impose its 
nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers of the Indian 
retailers.176  This was true even if imposition of the tax drastically 
reduced the Indian seller’s business with non-Indians by 
eliminating the price advantage that arose from the claimed tax 
exemption.177  The Court also relied on Moe for authority to impose 
at least “minimal” burdens on Indian retailers to collect the state 
tax.178  The Court said that the cigarette tax collection burden 
under review was indistinguishable from that approved in Moe.179
The burdens of Washington’s sales tax scheme, however, were 
more extensive than those approved in Moe.  The sales tax statutes 
required Indian retailers to keep detailed records of both exempt 
and nonexempt sales in addition to precollecting the sales tax.180  
For taxable sales to non-tribal members, the seller was required to 
record the number and dollar volume.181  For exempt sales to tribe 
members, the seller was required to record and retain for state 
inspection the names of all tribal purchasers, their tribal 
affiliations, the reservation on which the sale was made, and the 
amount and date of the sale.182  For members not known to the 
seller, presentation of a tribal identification card by the purchaser 
was required.183
The Court found the recordkeeping requirements completely 
valid.184  In a new twist on the Williams infringement test, the Court 
said the tribes had the burden of showing that the recordkeeping 
requirements were invalid.185  Since there was no evidence 
presented in the district court about whether the requirements 
were reasonably necessary, the tribes failed to meet their burden of 
proving that the state’s recordkeeping requirements were not 
“reasonably necessary” to prevent fraudulent transactions.186
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 159. 
 177. Id. at 157. 
 178. Id. at 159. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 160. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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Colville established the level of state need for regulation as one 
of reasonable necessity to meet the state purpose and further 
established a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction to regulate, 
which must be disproved by the tribe.187
In addressing the preemption part of the Williams 
infringement test, the Colville Court said that “[t]he federal statutes 
cited to us, even when given the broadest reading to which they are 
fairly susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt Washington’s sales 
and cigarette taxes.”188  The Court also found no support for 
preemption of the state tax laws in the tribe’s treaties.189  Having 
addressed the preemption question, the Court held that the state 
did not infringe on tribal rights to self-government merely because 
its laws deprived the tribe from its cigarette sales income by 
removing the tax exemption.190  The Court also held that “the 
State’s interest in taxing these purchasers outweighs any tribal 
interest that may exist in preventing the State from imposing its 
taxes.”191  Finding no federal preemption and an acceptable level of 
burden on the tribe, the Court held that the state statutes were 
valid.192
The Court reviewed the principles of Williams, McClanahan, 
and Colville again in 1994 in Department of Taxation & Finance of New 
York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., Inc.,193 in which New York attempted 
to enforce its cigarette tax laws on non-Indian purchasers at tribal 
shops by means of restrictions, recordkeeping requirements, and 
precollection of the taxes imposed on wholesalers who provided 
the cigarettes to the tribes.194
The cigarette tax system in New York required licensed Indian-
trader wholesalers to purchase tax stamps and affix them to 
cigarette packages before retail sale.195  The tax became a part of 
the retail price of the cigarettes and was considered a tax on the 
ultimate purchaser, not the wholesaler or the retailer.196  The state 
believed that far more untaxed cigarettes were being sold on 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 155. 
 189. Id. at 156. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 161. 
 192. Id. 
 193. 512 U.S. 61 (1994). 
 194. Id. at 64–67 (outlining New York’s cigarette taxation regulations). 
 195. Id. at 64. 
 196. Id. 
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reservations than would be the case if only tribe members were 
purchasing them; so, it instituted a system of quotas based on 
calculated demand for cigarettes by Indians purchasing on the 
reservation.197  The system also imposed recordkeeping 
requirements related to sales of untaxed cigarettes.198
The Milhelm Attea Court first confronted the question of 
“whether the New York scheme is inconsistent with the Indian 
Trader Statutes.”199  The question was whether the extensive 
collection of federal laws regulating wholesalers trading with 
Indians preempted application of the state’s regulatory scheme.200  
The Court reviewed the system of federal laws and rules governing 
Indian traders and noted its “sweeping” and “comprehensive” 
scope.201  Nevertheless, the Court found that because the cigarette 
tax in question was not imposed directly on the traders, it was not 
governed by the federal system.202  The Court held “Indian traders 
are not wholly immune from state regulation that is reasonably 
necessary to the assessment or collection of lawful state taxes.”203
Having found no federal preemption, the Court still had to 
address other principles that might preclude the state from 
exercising its jurisdiction.204  The next hurdle, the Court said, was to 
decide whether the lower court was correct in striking the state law 
because it “imposes excessive burdens on Indian traders.”205  It is 
interesting that in this case, the balancing test between the state 
interest and the burden is applied to the burden on Indian traders, 
not the burden on the tribes themselves. Nevertheless, the Court 
said it would apply the reasoning of its Indian cases and cited 
Colville in saying that the system was “a ‘reasonably necessary’ 
method of ‘preventing fraudulent transactions.’”206
After Milhelm, it is possible to draw some conclusions about the 
status of the states’ right to regulate Indians and Indian tribes.  
First, it is still true that states have very little authority to regulate 
 197. Id. at 65. 
 198. Id. at 67. 
 199. Id. at 70. 
 200. Id. at 64. 
 201. Id. at 70 (citing Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 
685, 687-89 (1965)). 
 202. Id. at 74–75. 
 203. Id. at 75. 
 204. See id. 
 205. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 206. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160, 162 (1980)). 
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strictly on-reservation transactions involving tribe members.  State 
authority to regulate off-reservation activities or on-reservation 
conduct with non-tribe members is much broader.  Apparently, a 
federal preemption test will be applied, and if federal law preempts 
the state regulation, the latter will fail.207  But, the federal 
preemption may have to be quite specific to the conduct the state is 
attempting to regulate.  The mere establishment of a reservation or 
recognition of a tribe by the federal government will not likely be a 
sufficient basis for a finding of federal preemption. 
Once it is determined that federal preemption is not 
applicable, a balancing test will be applied.208  The test has evolved 
to a point where it appears to tilt in favor of the state.  If the state is 
attempting to apply a law of general application, the state must 
show that the regulation is reasonably necessary to advance a 
legitimate state interest.209  The regulation may burden the subject 
Indian tribe so long as it does not interfere with the actual 
functions of tribal government.  If it does interfere with tribal self-
government, the tribe would be required to show that the 
regulation is excessively burdensome or not reasonably necessary 
before the state would be precluded from applying it. 
States’ ability to apply their laws in Indian territory and against 
Indians has changed greatly since Worcester v. Georgia.  Although the 
states’ jurisdiction to regulate Indian tribes has greatly expanded, 
the states still face limits on their ability to enforce their regulations 
by legal suit against tribes. 
VI. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM SUIT: FROM A WEAK START 
TO A SKEPTICAL AFFIRMATION 
By 1998, the doctrine of sovereign immunity of Indian tribes 
had undergone more than 150 years of change and modification, 
mostly to the detriment of the Indian tribes.  Tribes could no 
longer enter into treaties and their sovereignty was completely 
subject to the plenary power of Congress.  The states’ authority to 
regulate on-reservation conduct and to require tribes to take part 
in tax collection, recordkeeping, and disclosure was firmly 
established.  State regulatory jurisdiction over off-reservation 
activities was even greater. 
   207.    See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). 
   208.    Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 176 (1963). 
   209.    Id. at 177. 
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But one powerful aspect of sovereignty—sovereign immunity 
from suit—was introduced into the law “almost by accident,”210 and 
became a canon of federal common law. 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit for Indian tribes 
has a sketchy beginning.  Possibly, its first mention was in 1919, in 
Turner v. United States.211  The action was one for damages against 
the Creek Nation for its members tearing down Turner’s fence, 
which was on the Creek Nation’s land.212  Turner tried 
unsuccessfully to obtain compensation through the tribal court 
system until the tribe was dissolved in 1906.213  In 1908, Congress 
passed a law allowing Turner’s suit to be heard in the U.S. Court of 
Claims.214  The court of claims heard Turner’s petition and 
dismissed it.215
The Supreme Court, in reviewing the decision of the court of 
claims, found that there was no right at law to recover damages and 
that no such right had been established by Congress’s 
authorization of jurisdiction over the matter in the court of 
claims.216  The Court said that “[l]ike other governments, municipal 
as well as state, the Creek Nation was free from liability for injuries 
to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the 
peace.”217  In what might be considered unfortunate dicta, the 
Court summarized by saying that “[t]he fundamental obstacle to 
recover is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a 
substantive right to recover the damages resulting from failure of a 
government or its officers to keep the peace.”218
 210. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). 
 211. 248 U.S. 354 (1919). 
 212. Id. at 356–57. 
 213. Id. at 356. 
 214. Id. at 365–57. 
 215. Id. at 357. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 357–58. 
 218. Id. at 358.  A review of the court of claims decision in Turner v. United 
States, 51 Ct. Cl. 125 (1916) suggests that the court did not even consider 
immunity from suit.  The court questioned whether personal jurisdiction over the 
tribe had been obtained, but without answering that question, went to the merits 
of the case.  See id. at 141.  The court said that the plaintiff styled his case as one in 
contract, but that the petition claimed that a mob of Indians destroyed his fence.  
Id. at 146, 152.  If that was the case, the court said, “the Creek Nation is not to be 
held responsible for the mob’s action.”  Id. at 152.  As an alternative theory, the 
court said that the action might be one against individuals who were excessive in 
their efforts to remove a public nuisance.  Id. at 153–54.  In that case also, the 
Creek Nation would not be liable.  Id. at 154.  In the end, the court of claims 
found that the plaintiff’s action would lie in tort, not in contract.  Id.  The special 
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The dicta in Turner became the holding in United States v. 
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co.219  The United States, acting on 
behalf of certain Indian tribes, sued U.S. F&G on a bond issued for 
the Tribes’ benefit.220  U.S. F&G and the principal on the bond 
raised a Missouri state court judgment as a defense to the tribes’ 
claims.221  The state court action arose on the same facts and 
resulted in judgment against the tribes on a cross-claim by the bond 
principal in an amount that exceeded the tribes’ claims on the 
bond.222  In the federal action, the United States, on behalf of the 
tribes, argued that the Missouri judgment was void because the 
tribes had sovereign immunity from suit in the state courts.223
The Supreme Court noted the “public policy” that exempted 
the tribes from suit and, citing Turner as authority, held that 
“[t]hese Indian Nations are exempt from suit without 
Congressional authorization.”224
The doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit carried 
forward in the cases with little analysis.  In Oklahoma Tax 
Commissioner v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma,225 the 
Potawatomi Tribe sued to enjoin the Oklahoma Tax Commissioner 
from collecting taxes on all sales of cigarettes at the tribe-operated 
store.226  The Commissioner counterclaimed for the state’s $2.7 
million tax claim and to enjoin the tribe from selling untaxed 
cigarettes in the future.227
As in its previous decisions, the Court upheld the state’s 
regulations imposing cigarette taxes on sales by the tribe to non-
members and requiring tribal collection and reporting of the 
taxes.228
statute allowing the action did not expand the court of claims’ regular jurisdiction, 
which was over contract only.  Id. at 154–55.  For that reason, the court said it had 
no jurisdiction over the matter.  Id. at 155.  Even having found no jurisdiction over 
the type of claim, the court ended its opinion by saying, “We conclude that the 
Creek Nation is not liable to the plaintiff, and his petition must, therefore, be 
dismissed.”  Id.  Nothing in the court of claims opinion suggested that the issue of 
tribal sovereign immunity from suit was ever considered. 
 219. 309 U.S. 506 (1940). 
 220. Id. at 510. 
 221. Id. at 511. 
 222. Id. at 510. 
 223. Id. at 510–11. 
 224. Id. at 512. 
 225. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
 226. Id. at 507. 
 227. Id. at 507–08. 
 228. Id. at 512. 
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With respect to the counterclaim for unpaid taxes, Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, recognized the tribe’s sovereign 
immunity from suit and, relying on U.S. F&G, held that the 
immunity also applied to Oklahoma’s counterclaim for taxes 
owed.229  The Court rejected Oklahoma’s arguments that tribal 
sovereign immunity from suit should be limited or abandoned in 
the immediate case because it “impermissibly burdens the 
administration of state tax laws” or “because tribal business 
activities such as cigarette sales are now so detached from 
traditional tribal interests that the tribal sovereignty doctrine no 
longer makes sense in this context.”230
The state argued that by barring suit against the tribe to collect 
the taxes or compel regulatory compliance, the Court had provided 
a right without a remedy.231  The Court recognized that sovereign 
immunity from suit might bar the state from the most efficient 
remedy, but that it did not preclude all remedies.232  In considering 
other remedies that may be available, the Court pointed out that it 
has never held that individual agents or officers of a tribe would 
not be liable for damages in an action brought by the state.233  Thus, 
some sort of suit against a tribal officer was apparently permitted 
under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. 
The most recent attempt to narrow or reverse the doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity from suit occurred in 1998 in Kiowa Tribe 
v. Manufacturing Technologies.234  There, defendant sued in state 
court to collect a contractual debt of $285,000 owed by the Kiowa 
Tribe.235  Although the facts were not entirely clear, it appeared that 
the debt was incurred off the reservation and that payments were to 
be made off the reservation.236  The transaction was a commercial 
one not involving tribal government.237  The tribe opposed state 
court jurisdiction based on its immunity from suit in state courts.238
The Supreme Court, in a skeptical opinion, upheld the 
doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit with five Justices 
 229. Id. at 509–10. 
 230. Id. at 510. 
 231. Id. at 514. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
 235. Id. at 754. 
 236. See id. at 753–54. 
   237.    Id. at 753.      
   238.    Id. at 753–54. 
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joining Justice Kennedy in the majority.239  A strongly worded 
dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by two other Justices, would have 
limited the doctrine to actions involving tribal government and 
would not apply it to the commercial litigation under 
consideration.240  What makes the case especially interesting is that 
even the majority opinion, while maintaining the doctrine, 
expresses much doubt in its continuing application. 
Justice Kennedy started the opinion with a statement that 
tribes are subject to suit only where authorized by Congress or 
when the tribe has waived its immunity.241  He pointed out that in 
upholding immunity from suit, the Court has not made a 
distinction based on where the conduct occurred or on whether it 
involved governmental or commercial activities.242  The state 
regulatory cases, he pointed out, are not contradictory to this 
doctrine, as “[t]here is a difference between the right to demand 
compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce 
them.”243
Justice Kennedy then examined the origins of tribal immunity 
from suit, tracing the roots of the doctrine to its almost accidental 
recognition in Turner through the recent effort to have it narrowed 
in Potawatomi.244  He acknowledged that the doctrine “can be 
challenged as inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises 
extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities”245 
and that “[t]here are reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating 
the doctrine.”246
Nevertheless, the majority declined to confine the doctrine to 
reservations or to noncommercial activities, “defer[ring] to the role 
Congress may wish to exercise in this important judgment”247 
because “Congress is in a position to weigh and accommodate the 
competing policy concerns and reliance issues.  The capacity of the 
 239. Id. at 753–60. 
 240. Id. at 760–66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 241. Id. at 754. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Bethold Reservation 
v. Wold Eng’g P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 
(1940)). 
 242. Id. at 755. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 756–57. 
 245. Id. at 757–58. 
 246. Id. at 758. 
 247. Id. 
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Legislative Branch to address the issue by comprehensive 
legislation counsels some caution by us in this area.”248
In the Court’s final paragraph, suggesting a possible limit of 
the holding to the facts of the case, Kennedy concludes, “Tribes 
enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether those contracts 
involve governmental or commercial activities and whether they 
were made on or off a reservation.”249
One may assume that, in reaching its conclusion in Kiowa, the 
Court was simultaneously considering what was happening in 
Congress.  Kiowa was argued in January 1998.  In February 1998, 
Senator Slade Gordon introduced the “American Indian Equal 
Justice Act,” identified as “a bill to provide for Indian legal 
reform.”250  Passage of the bill would have resulted in sweeping 
changes in the law, giving federal and state courts jurisdiction over 
most claims against tribes and waiving sovereign immunity for 
those actions.251  Kiowa was decided on May 26, 1998.  Hearings on 
Senator Slade’s bill were held in March and May 1998, but the bill 
was never voted on by the Senate.252
Justice Stevens, leading the dissent and joined by Justices 
Thomas and Ginsburg, believed that rather than merely following 
precedent, the majority was extending tribal immunity from suit 
beyond its previous contours.253  No previous case had considered 
immunity from suit in a purely commercial activity that did not 
involve on-reservation conduct.  The dissenters would not expand 
the doctrine and would have allowed the state court matter to 
proceed.254
The net result of Kiowa seems to be an invitation to Congress 
to act, coupled with a skeptical, although still absolute, holding that 
tribes are immune from suit, at least in contract.  The limit of the 
principal holding to contract cases probably results from Justice 
Kennedy’s care not to extend the holding beyond the facts of the 
case. 
 248. Id. at 759. 
 249. Id. at 760. 
 250. American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1691, 105th Cong. § 2, reprinted in 
144 CONG. REC. S1155–06 (1998) (proposed). 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Timothy Egan, Backlash Growing as Indians Make a Stand for Sovereignty, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html? 
res=940DEFDA1430F93AA35750C0A96E958260. 
 253. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760. 
 254. See id. at 760 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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After Kiowa, there remained three points on which a challenge 
to tribal immunity from suit might be supported.  The first is that 
Kiowa was limited to suits on contracts.  Second, in Kiowa, the Court 
was urged to confine tribal immunity to suits arising on the 
reservation or related to noncommercial activity, but Justice 
Kennedy said that “[w]e decline to draw this distinction in this 
case,”255 possibly suggesting that there may be a case where the 
distinction would be drawn.  Finally, the door remained open from 
the holding of Potawatomi that suit might be authorized against 
individual tribal officers. 
In fact, three courts, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, the Iowa Supreme Court, and the North Dakota 
Supreme Court have all narrowed Kiowa and allowed suits in equity 
against Indian tribes with neither congressional nor tribal 
consent.256   
Although the cases straying from the Kiowa ruling are few, that 
they exist, and that in at least one case the petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied, suggest that the 
doctrine of tribal immunity from suit is not yet settled.  Congress 
has not accepted the Kiowa Court’s invitation to act in the nine 
years since its proffer.  The three justices who joined in the Kiowa 
dissent are still members of the Court; two of the six in the majority 
no longer serve.  The right case could result in a significant shift in 
the federal common law of tribal sovereign immunity.  Some 
thought that case would be Fair Political Practices Commission v. Agua 
 255. Id. at 758 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 256. See generally Comstock Oil & Gas v. Ala. & Coushatta Indian Tribes of Tex., 
261 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 971 (2002) (denying sovereign 
immunity from suit for injunctive relief for both tribal officers and the tribes 
themselves); TTEA v. Yselta del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding 
that tribal officers had no sovereign immunity from suit in an action for an 
injunction, limiting Kiowa to suits on contract); Wasker v. Bear, No. 04-1917 (Iowa 
Ct. App. filed Oct. 25, 2006) (involving a tribal leadership dispute holding that the 
tribe was an indispensable party but denying defendants’ argument that once the 
tribe was joined, tribal sovereign immunity from suit would preclude state 
jurisdiction; holding that tribal sovereign immunity from suit is not available in an 
action for declaratory judgment which does not include a claim for damages); 
Cass County Joint Water Res. Dist. v. 1.43 Acres of Land & Turtle Mountain Band 
of Chippewa Indians, 643 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 2002) (holding that tribal sovereign 
immunity from suit was not applicable in a state action to condemn land held by 
the tribe in fee, noting that the action was not one for damages and that the land 
was off the reservation). 
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Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians,257 which began in California in 
2002. 
VII. AGUA CALIENTE:  BIG MONEY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
The development of Indian law in the United States over more 
than 160 years, summarized in the above sections, set the stage for 
the most recent and most direct state challenge to tribal sovereign 
immunity:  The California Fair Political Practices Commission (the 
“FPPC”) sued the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians in 
California state court seeking injunctive relief and money 
damages.258  The FPPC alleged unreported contributions in excess 
of $7,500,000. 259
The Agua Caliente Band filed a motion in the trial court to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity from suit.260  The trial court denied the Band’s 
motion261 and the matter was appealed to the California Court of 
Appeal, which also denied the Band’s requested relief.262  The 
California Supreme Court granted the Band’s petition for review in 
the matter of Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Fair Political 
Practices Commission.263
On one side of the dispute was the Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians situated in southern California.  Before the 
existence of the United States, the Agua Caliente Band inhabited 
about 2000 square miles of land around what is now the Palm 
Springs area of California.264  In the 1860s the United States 
government gave the odd-numbered sections of land in that area to 
the Southern Pacific Railroad.265  In 1876, the Agua Caliente Indian 
Reservation was established by executive order of President 
Grant.266  Because of the previous grants to the railroad, the 
 257. No. 02AS04545, 2003 WL 733094 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 
2003). 
 258. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians, 148 P.3d 1126, 1128 (Cal. 2006). 
 259. Id. at 1128–29 (alleging unreported contributions in excess of $7,500,000 
in count one).  The penalty for unreported contributions is one times the amount 
that was not reported.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 91004.   
 260. Aqua Caliente, 148 P.3d  at 1129. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 1126. 
 264. Aqua Caliente History & Culture, supra note 1. 
 265. Id.  
 266. Id. 
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reservation consisted of a checkerboard pattern of sections of land 
totaling 31,500 acres.267
The Agua Caliente Reservation was subject to the allotment 
laws of the United States, ending in 1959, at which time Congress 
authorized the Tribe and its members to lease their land for 
periods up to ninety-nine years.268  Today, much of the original 
reservation has been developed under such leases and underlies 
much of Palm Springs, Cathedral City, and portions of Rancho 
Mirage.269  The Tribe itself operates two major casinos, a golf resort, 
and other commercial operations on its land.270  It has another 
hotel under construction and is involved in condominium and 
single family home developments.271
On the other side of the dispute was the FPPC, which is 
charged with administration and enforcement of California’s 
Political Reform Act (PRA), adopted by initiative in 1974.272  As a 
citizen initiative, the PRA included findings adopted by the voters.  
Among these were findings that large campaign contributions by 
lobbyists and organizations allow them to “gain disproportionate 
influence over governmental decisions”273 and that previous 
campaign finance laws “suffered from inadequate enforcement by 
state and local authorities.”274
The PRA, like many post-Watergate campaign finance 
regulation schemes (including Minnesota’s 1974 Ethics in 
Government Act),275 provided for a comprehensive system of 
regulation and disclosure of financial activities that could influence 
elections or elected officials.276  Buckley v. Valeo,277 and other cases278 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Aqua Caliente Tribal Enterprises, http://www.aguacaliente.org/Tribal 
Enterprises/tabid/60/Default.aspx (last visited Dec. 27, 2007). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 81000–91014 (2005).  See also § 81000 
(noting the PRA’s approval and effective dates). 
 273. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 81001(c). 
 274. Id. at subdiv. (h). 
 275. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 470 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. ch. 10A 
(2006)). 
 276. See generally Roger Jon Diamond et al., Political Reform Act: Greater Access to 
the Initiative Process, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 453 (1975) (providing a comprehensive 
examination of the PRA).  See also Daniel A. Weitzman, Expenditure Limitations in 
Campaigns for Statewide Office in California, 6 PAC. L.J. 631, 658 (1975) (“Unlike 
many states plagued by ineffective legislation in the form of vague, unenforceable, 
and loophole ridden campaign financing laws, the Political Reform Act of 1974 
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have clarified the constitutionality of such statutory schemes, and in 
Agua Caliente the tribe did not challenge the PRA itself.279
Also, in Agua Caliente, the Tribe “recognized that the state has 
the power to regulate political campaigns or create campaign 
contribution disclosure rules within its borders.”280  Given the 
history of the regulatory cases, it would be hard to conceive of a 
situation more appropriate for state regulation.  A key state interest 
was at issue, no federal preemption existed, and, because the 
Tribe’s reservation was created by executive order rather than 
treaty, no sovereignty issue could be based on treaty language.281
Having conceded the state’s authority to regulate, the Tribe 
was left with the sole defense of its sovereign immunity from suit, 
and it was on this issue that the matter reached the state supreme 
court (the trial court and intermediate appellate court had both 
ruled against the Tribe).282
The FPPC acknowledged that the Tribe had not waived its 
claim of sovereign immunity from suit and that Congress had not 
authorized the suit.283  The question, then, was whether the state’s 
right to regulate in the area of campaign finance and lobbying and 
to enforce those regulations by legal action was sufficient to 
overcome the Tribe’s immunity from suit. 
The Tribe argued that its immunity from suit arose from the 
U.S. Constitution, but it was unable to provide support for that 
provides California with the necessary machinery for controlling and enforcing 
the new campaign expenditure limitations.”). 
 277.  424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that provisions of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act limiting individual contributions to campaigns and requiring 
disclosure of expenditures are constitutional, despite First Amendment free 
speech objections). 
 278. See, e.g., FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding 
that Federal Election Campaign Act provision prohibiting direct expenditure of 
corporate funds in connection with election to public office, as applied to anti-
abortion group’s distribution of letters and pamphlets, violates the First 
Amendment right to free speech); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 
197 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment right to association must yield to 
the interests that Congress sought to protect by enacting the Federal Election 
Campaign Act). 
 279. See Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians, 148 P.3d 1126, 1129–30 (Cal. 2006). 
 280. Id. at 1130. 
 281. Id. at 1130, 1132. 
 282. See id. at 1129–30 (discussing the lower courts’ opinions). 
 283. Real Party in Interest’s Opp’n Br. on the Merits at 9, Agua Caliente Band 
of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126 (Cal. 2006) (No. S123832), 
2005 WL 760047. 
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position.284  In fact, the historical review in the previous sections of 
this Article suggests that there is no such support to be found.  Any 
sovereign right to immunity from suit would have to arise from a 
tribe’s inherent sovereignty or from treaties, giving it exclusive 
jurisdiction over its land.  Having no treaty, the Agua Caliente 
Tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit could be based only on 
federal common law.  Case law supporting that immunity had a 
weak beginning and culminated with the less-than-enthusiastic 
endorsement of the Kiowa Court. 
Considering the Supreme Court’s misgivings about the 
doctrine of immunity from suit expressed directly in the Kiowa 
dissent, and also acknowledged by that Court’s majority, it is easy to 
speculate that had Agua Caliente reached the California Supreme 
Court solely on the arguments raised in previous cases, the 
California justices may have found Agua Caliente to be the case 
where the distinction from other cases was sufficient to allow them 
to explicitly draw the contours of the doctrine. 
The FPPC, however, in its unique role as protector of the 
sovereign state’s elections process, was able to raise constitutional 
issues that had not been available to previous states seeking to sue 
Indian tribes.  To surmount the remaining “slender reed” of 
support for immunity from suit left after Kiowa, the FPPC claimed it 
had an affirmative right to sue the Tribe under the United States 
Constitution.  To support its claim, the FPPC relied on the 
Guarantee Clause285 and the states’ reserved rights expressed in the 
Tenth Amendment to argue that the state had a constitutional 
right to enforce its campaign finance laws by suit and that this 
constitutional right superseded any common law or inherent right 
the Tribe had immunizing it from suit by the state.286
Article IV, Section 4, provides: “The United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government . . . .”287  The Tenth Amendment provides: “The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
 284. See Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1131 (“The Tribe asserts that sovereign 
immunity from suit has a constitutional basis because the [F]ederal Constitution 
provides Congress with plenary power over Indian affairs.   The Tribe, however, 
fails to cite any authority that specifically states that tribal immunity from suit is a 
constitutional imperative.”). 
 285. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 286. See Agua Caliente, 148 P.3d at 1135–36 (setting forth the FPPC’s 
contentions with respect to the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment). 
 287. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.”288
The FPPC cited Gregory v. Ashcroft289 in support of its position 
that constitutional provisions guarantee it the right to regulate 
election finance and to sue to enforce its regulations.290  Gregory 
dealt with a Missouri constitutional provision setting qualifications 
for state judges.291  The provision was alleged to be in conflict with a 
federal statute, and the question was whether the federal statute 
must be given application.292  The state constitutional provision, the 
Court said, went “beyond an area traditionally regulated by the 
States” to a decision “of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign 
entity” since, “[t]hrough the structure of its government, and the 
character of those who exercise government authority, a State 
defines itself as a sovereign.”293
In addition to upholding Missouri’s right to regulate the 
qualifications of elected officials by its conclusion that Congress did 
not intend the federal statute’s application to extend into this area 
of traditional state sovereignty, the Court discussed, in dicta, its 
recent line of cases addressing “the unique nature of state decisions 
that ‘go to the heart of representative government.’”294  Quoting 
 288. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 289. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 290. See Real Party in Interest’s Opp’n Br. on the Merits, supra note 283, at 12. 
   291.    Gregory, 501 U.S. at 455. 
   292.    Gregory was a case in which the state mandatory age limit for judges 
conflicted with a federal statute prohibiting age discrimination.  Id.  The Court 
held that the federal statute did not apply to state court judges because Congress, 
in order to “upset the usual constitutional balance” between federal power and the 
state’s rights retained under the Tenth Amendment to regulate its own elections, 
would have had to “make its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language 
of the statute.”  Id. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Having disposed of 
the matter through limiting statutory construction, the Court did not reach the 
Guarantee Clause issue, rendering its statements in that regard dicta.  See id. at 
458, 463. 
 293. Id. at 460. 
 294. Id. at 461 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
Sugarman was the first in a series of cases to consider the restrictions 
imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on the ability of state and local governments to prohibit aliens from 
public employment.   In that case, the Court struck down under the 
Equal Protection Clause a New York City law that provided a flat ban 
against the employment of aliens in a wide variety of city jobs. 
Id. 
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Oregon v. Mitchell,295 the Court recognized that “the Framers of the 
Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as 
provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections 
. . . .”296
The Gregory Court said that the states’ authority that lies “at the 
heart of representative government” is reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment and guaranteed them by that provision of 
the Constitution under which the United States “guarantee[s] to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”297
The FPPC went on to argue that laws designed to prevent 
corruption of the political process, such as the PRA, are an exercise 
of the states’ constitutional power to regulate elections and the 
constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government.298  
Those states’ constitutional rights, the FPPC argued, must be given 
effect over the Tribe’s immunity from suit, which is a creation of 
federal common law.299
By citing cases in which states challenged federal laws that 
infringed on the states’ sovereign governments300 and selecting 
quotes of general principle, many of which were dicta, the FPPC 
attempted to elevate the Guarantee Clause and the reservation of 
rights in the Tenth Amendment to create an affirmative power in 
the state to sue not the federal government, but other entities, to 
enforce the asserted constitutional right. 
 The Tribe argued that the Guarantee Clause is not a grant of 
authority or an affirmative right to the states; rather, it imposes an 
obligation on the federal government to guarantee to the states a 
republican form of government.301  The Guarantee Clause may have 
been relevant for consideration in the cases cited by the FPPC 
because those cases arose on the basis of claims that Congress, by 
 295. 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (invalidating a federal statute that imposed, inter alia, 
a national voting age for state elections; this case was in turn abrogated by the 
ratification of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971). 
 296. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461–62 (quoting  Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124–25). 
 297. Id. at 463 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648). 
 298. Real Party in Interest’s Opp’n Br. on the Merits, supra note 283, at 14–16. 
 299. Id. 
 300. See id. at 12–13.  The FPPC relied on Gregory, which did not reach the 
Guarantee Clause question since the Court held the federal statute was not 
intended to apply.  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. The FPPC also relied on Mitchell, 
which dealt with federal statutes that attempted to impose voting requirements on 
state elections.  See 401 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 301. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians’ Opening Br. on the Merits at 
47–55, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Superior Court, 148 P.3d 1126 
(Cal. 2006) (No. S123832), 2004 WL 2823274. 
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passing laws that were inapposite to the state’s right to a republican 
form of government, had breached the constitutional guarantee.302
The California Supreme Court said: 
The Tribe correctly notes that the high court has not 
applied the Tenth Amendment or the guarantee clause to 
uphold a state’s enforcement of a state election provision 
against a sovereign tribe.  But neither has the court held 
that the federal common law doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity trumps state authority when a state acts in 
political matters resting firmly within its constitutional 
prerogatives.303
The California Supreme Court could have stopped at that 
point and concluded that the case was sufficiently different from 
any considered before and therefore the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity from suit would not apply under the facts of 
the case.  But the court did not take such an approach.  Rather, it 
went on to discuss the importance of state elections and the state’s 
ability to guard against corruption of the election process, finally 
holding that “the guarantee clause, together with the rights 
reserved under the Tenth Amendment, provide the FPPC authority 
under the Federal Constitution to bring suit against the Tribe in its 
enforcement of the PRA.”304
Thus, the California court elevated the Article IV, Section 4 
guarantee of a republican form of government, and the Tenth 
Amendment reservation of rights, to a full-blown affirmative 
constitutional right held by the State of California to sue Indian 
tribes in state court to preserve the integrity of the state’s election 
finance regulatory system.  The California court moderated its 
position only slightly in the conclusion section of its opinion, 
saying: 
In light of evolving United States Supreme Court 
precedent and the constitutionally significant importance 
of the state’s ability to provide a transparent election 
process with rules that apply equally to all parties who 
enter the electoral fray, we find the FPPC states the better 
case.  Although concepts of tribal immunity have long-
standing application under federal law, the state’s exercise 
 302. Id. 
 303. Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians, 148 P.3d 1126, 1138 (Cal. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 462; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)). 
 304. Id. at 1138–39. 
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of state sovereignty in the form of regulating its electoral 
process is protected under the Tenth Amendment and 
the guarantee clause.  We therefore find that the Tribe 
lacks immunity from suit for its alleged failure to follow 
the PRA’s mandated reporting requirements.305
Justice Moreno, joined by two other justices, dissented and 
would have held that the state did not have authority to sue the 
Tribe.306  The dissenters would have rejected the constitutional 
arguments raised by the FPPC and instead relied on Kiowa and the 
long line of Supreme Court precedent holding that Indian tribes 
have sovereign immunity from suit.307
The opinion of the California Supreme Court was filed on 
December 21, 2006.  A Petition for Rehearing was denied on 
February 28, 2007.308  On May 8, 2007, the Tribe requested an 
extension of sixty days within which to file a petition for writ of 
certiorari.309  That request was granted and the petition was due not 
later than July 28, 2007.310
On July 12, 2007, the Tribe notified the California Supreme 
Court that it had entered into a Stipulation for Judgment and that 
judgment had been entered in the district court.311  The Tribe 
indicated that it would not be filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
to the Supreme Court.312
In its stipulation for judgment, the Tribe waived its sovereign 
immunity for any action by the FPPC to enforce California’s 
   305.     Id. at 1140. 
   306.     Id. at 1140–1145 (Moreno, J., dissenting). 
  307.     See id. 
We have now begun to enter a new era in which tribal economic and 
political power is growing, and the ideal of tribal sovereignty is becoming 
more concretely realized.  If the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity 
needs to be modified to respond to these changes, federal law teaches 
that it is Congress, not the states, that is constitutionally delegated and 
historically assigned the task of making that modification, and it is in a 
unique position “to weigh and accommodate the competing policy 
concerns and reliance interests.” 
Id. at 1145 (quoting Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 759 (1998)). 
   308.     California Appellate Courts Case Information, http://appellatecases. 
courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=316566&doc_no=S123
832 (last visited Dec. 27, 2007).  
   309.     Id. 
   310.     Id. 
   311.     Id.  
 312.  Id. 
39
Goldsmith: Big Spenders in State Elections—Has Financial Participation by In
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
GOLDSMITH - ADC 2/3/2008  2:55:06 PM 
698 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:2 
 
Political Reform Act.313  It also agreed to pay a civil penalty of 
$250,000.314  Judgment was entered accordingly. 
VIII. SUMMING IT ALL UP: STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS DRAW 
THE FIRST FIRM LIMITS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY 
The law of Indian tribal relationships with states has changed 
dramatically from its roots in Worcester, in which Justice Marshall 
held with great clarity that “[t]he Cherokee nation, then, is a 
distinct community . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no 
force . . . .”315  In Kiowa, however, the majority found only a “slender 
reed”316 to support the original doctrine of tribal immunity from 
suit and recognized “reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating 
the doctrine.”317
Since Kiowa a few courts have distinguished the matters before 
them and held that there is no tribal sovereign immunity from a 
suit for equitable relief.318  California, after Agua Caliente, became 
the fourth jurisdiction to define the contours of tribal sovereign 
immunity from suit and the first to deny such immunity in an 
action for monetary damages.319  It is also the first to rely on a 
holding that the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment of 
the Constitution give rise to an affirmative right in the state to sue 
to defend its republican form of government. 
The result reached by the California Supreme Court is not as 
surprising as its reasoning.  With scant support in the cases, it 
found a previously unrecognized affirmative state constitutional 
right, which it then held was sufficient to override the federal 
common law holding that Indian tribes are generally immune from 
suit.  While the result may be presumed to be correct, the court’s 
position would have been more easily reconciled with the federal 
common law developed from M’Intosh320  through Kiowa321 if the 
court had recognized the state’s constitutional interest in protecting 
its election processes without elevating that interest to a 
   313.   Stipulation for J., FPPC v. Agua Caliente, No. 02AS04545 (Sacramento 
County Super. Ct. of Cal. 2002). 
   314.     Id. 
   315.     31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). 
   316.     523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998). 
   317.     Id. at 758. 
   318.     See supra note 256. 
   319.     See id. 
   320.     21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
   321.     523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
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constitutional right.  The court could have taken the position of the 
Fifth Circuit, and the other courts in cases cited above, and held 
that the matter before it was one in which the distinction not made 
in Kiowa322 could, in fact, be made and would be controlling. 
No case has been considered by the Supreme Court in which a 
state right so fundamental as regulating and protecting election 
processes was at odds with an Indian tribe’s assertion of its right to 
act free from the responsibility to answer for its actions in court.  
Should such a case reach the high Court, it seems quite possible 
that the contours of tribal sovereign immunity from suit will finally 
be drawn and that the doctrine’s application will be held to end 
where a state’s interest in preserving its republican form of 
government begins.  This can be accomplished, of course, without 
elevating the Guarantee Clause or the reservation of rights in the 
Tenth Amendment to create an affirmative right to sue an entity 
other than the federal government. 
The fact that the Agua Caliente Band decided to settle its 
dispute with the FPPC with a waiver of sovereign immunity from 
suit for all matters arising under the California Political Reform Act 
suggests that its evaluation of the law may have resulted in a similar 
conclusion.  Whether used to create a new right, or simply seen as a 
strong recognition of important state interests, the constitutional 
provisions argued by the FPPC could have easily tipped the delicate 
balance in the Supreme Court. 
As the examination of cases in this Article suggests, even the 
most slender reed of authority or dicta can become the basis for 
sweeping changes in legal doctrine.  For that reason, it would be 
dangerous for any Indian tribe to allow a case to reach the 
Supreme Court on the issue of tribal sovereign immunity from suit 
unless an outcome in favor of the tribe is reasonably certain.  Given 
the current state of the doctrine, that case may never arise again. 
Just as only a sovereign can enter into a treaty, only a sovereign 
can choose to waive its own immunity.  By entering into a 
stipulation with the FPPC, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla 
Indians may have actually strengthened its sovereignty.  Without 
 322. Id. at 758 (stating that the Court declines “in this case” to make a 
distinction between the case before it and others challenging tribal immunity from 
suit).   
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question, the Tribe limited its financial exposure323 and preserved 
the Kiowa holding, at least for the immediate future. 
 
 
 323. Stipulation for J., FPPC v. Agua Caliente, No. 02AS04545 (Sacramento 
County Sup. Ct. of Cal. 2002).  As noted previously in this Article, the Tribe’s 
exposure was in excess of $7,500,000.  The stipulation provided for payment of 
$200,000 to the state, not as civil penalty, but as consideration for the stipulation. 
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